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EXPLORING THE HIDDEN DOMAINS OF CIVIL




On September 21, 1989, at 7:40 a.m. in a small Texas town, a Coca-
Cola truck, its brakes failing, ran a stop sign and hit a school bus.1 The
bus, loaded with children on their way to school, careened off the road
into a rain-filled gravel pit, killing twenty-one children. Newspapers
throughout the country reported the accident and its aftermath, in-
cluding the subsequent filing of numerous wrongful death suits. 2
This was merely the beginning of a nightmarish legal morass. Law-
yers swarmed over the grieving town, signing up, and then stealing
each other's clients. Members of the community accused each other of
trying to profit from its collective tragedy. 3 These events led to even
more litigation. The town sued the state for failing to construct guard-
rails; the rescue workers sued for the emotional distress incident to
their efforts to save children at the scene of the accident; lawyers sued
other lawyers, lawyers were prosecuted for barratry, and residents of
the town were sued for slander.4 A tragic accident became just an-
other episode in the seemingly unending saga of America's explosion
of litigation.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science, Amherst College.
1. See Michael Kennedy, Grief Greed and the Lawyers, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1990, at El.
2. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, 19 Students Die When Bus Plunges Into Water, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1989, at A12; School Bus Crash Probed: NTSB Finds No Sign of Brake Failure in Truck, UNION-
TRIBUNE, (San Diego), Sept. 23, 1989, at A3.
3. In many communities,
[tiragedies draw people closer together. In this clannish rural community near the Mex-
ico border, the school bus accident that killed 21 children last fall did not simply split
the town, but splintered it. First by grief, then by greed. In the eight tumultuous months
since the accident, Alton has been jolted by death threats, brawls, a fast-proliferating
spate of lawsuits, city financial probes, a mayoral recall drive, charges of ambulance-
chasing against prominent Hispanic leaders, the suspension of the entire 30-man volun-
teer fire department-even accusations of witchcraft.
Paul Weingarten, Lawsuits, Greed Tear Grieving Texas Town, Cm. TRIB., May 27, 1990, at A23.
4. For examples of this litigation, see Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.
1991); Lopez v. Texas, 846 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App. 1992); Texas v. Sandoval, 842 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.
App. 1992); Murillo v. Valley Coca-Cola Bottling, 895 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App. 1995).
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In 1991, Russell Banks turned this tragedy into fiction, in his criti-
cally acclaimed novel The Sweet Hereafter. Using four different char-
acters as narrators, Banks tells the story of life and death in a small
town. However, in Banks' account, the accident has no obvious cause.
Inexplicably, the bus leaves the road, crashes through a guardrail, and
then sinks slowly into a freezing lake.
Six years later, the novel was turned into a film by Atom Egoyan, its
plot intact. The film, like the book, takes us into the hidden domains
of civil justice as it chronicles a lawyer's intense, sometimes frantic
efforts to enlist some of the bereaved parents as plaintiffs in a wrong-
ful death suit and convince them that the bus accident was an injus-
tice, not a misfortune. 5 This film marks an important, and somewhat
unusual, moment in the cultural life of law because it does not focus
on a trial as the key element in law's representation, 6 but rather exam-
ines the social, psychological, cultural, and professional forces at play
in the emergence and transformation of disputes. While trials provide
a ubiquitous dramatic framing for popular representations of law, the
processes through which problems are defined, blame is assigned, and
claims are made, remain virtually unexplored as subjects in popular
culture.
Watching The Sweet Hereafter, prompted me to revisit an article I
co-authored almost twenty years ago that urged scholars to explore
the hidden domains of civil justice and to examine processes that we
labeled "naming, blaming, and claiming."'7 In that article, my co-au-
thors and I argued that "trouble, problems, [and] personal and social
dislocation are everyday occurrences. Yet, social scientists have rarely
studied the capacity of people to tolerate substantial distress and in-
justice."' 8 We suggested that responses to those events could be under-
stood as occurring in three stages. The first stage, defining a particular
experience as injurious, we called naming. 9 The next step in the life
5. Judith Shklar has asked, "[wihen is a disaster a misfortune and when is it an injustice?
Intuitively," she claims,
the answer seems quite obvious. If the dreadful event is caused by external forces of
nature, it is a misfortune and we must resign ourselves to our suffering. Should, how-
ever, some ill-intentioned agent, human or supernatural, have brought it about, then it
is an injustice and we may express indignation and outrage.
See JUDITH SHKLAR, TmE FACES OF INJUSTICE 1 (1990).
6. On the ubiquity of the trial in popular culture representations of law, see Carol Clover,
Law and the Order of Popular Culture, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 97 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998).
7. See William L.F. Felstiner, et. al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, and Claiming, 15 LAW & Soc'Y. REv. 631, 631-54 (1980-81).
8. Id. at 633.
9. Id. at 632-33.
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cycle of a dispute "is the transformation of a perceived injurious expe-
rience into a grievance. This occurs when a person attributes an injury
to the fault of another individual or social entity."' 1 This stage we
called blaming. The third step occurs "when someone with a grievance
voices it to the person or entity believed to be responsible and asks for
some remedy."" This final stage is called claiming.
We contended that "only a small fraction of injurious experiences
ever mature into disputes. Furthermore, we know that most of the
attrition occurs in the early stages: experiences are not perceived as
injurious; perceptions do not ripen into grievances; grievances are
voiced to intimates but not to the person deemed responsible."'1 2 Pay-
ing attention to the process of dispute transformation and the high
rate of attrition in, or resistance to, the emergence of disputes was, we
contended, a way of putting the burgeoning argument about the litiga-
tion explosion in context.13 We argued that the processes through
which disputes emerge, or through which people decide to "lump it,"
are "subjective, unstable, reactive, complicated, and incomplete.' 14
Most of what occurs in this domain of civil justice is cultural, not legal.
These events occur in the everyday lives of ordinary citizens who
struggle to make sense of who they are and who they want to be in a
world of risk, danger, and injury. 15 Yet, it should not be a surprise that
lawyers play key roles as agents and audiences in the complex cultural
processes of naming, blaming, and claiming, sometimes assisting to
calm people down, thereby discouraging the blaming or claiming,
while at other times, amplifying grievances and encouraging disputing.
10. Id. at 635.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 636.
13. For one example of a critique of the litigation explosion, see Jethro Lieberman's, The
Litigious Society. "Ours," Lieberman contends, "is a law-drenched age .... Though litigation
has not routed out al other forms of fight, it is gaining public favor as the legitimate and most
effective means of seeking and winning one's just deserts. So widespread is the impulse to sue
that litigation has become the nation's secular religion." JETHRO LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGious
SoCmrY xi (1981). See also PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CON-
SEQUENCES (1988). We suggested that attention to the emergence and transformation of disputes
renders "problematic one of the most fundamental political judgments about disputing that
there is too much of it, that Americans are an over-contentious people, far too ready to litigate.
The transformation perspective suggests that there may be too little conflict in our society."
Felstiner, supra note 7, at 651.
14. Felstiner, supra note 7, at 637.
15. For a rich and interesting picture of this world, see PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY,
THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); see also LAW IN EVERY-
DAY LIFE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
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Since the time t co-authored that article, what is sometimes referred
to as the "litigious society,' 6 or at other times labeled the quest for
"total justice"' 7 has firmly secured its place in the cultural argot, be-
coming a taken-for-granted aspect of our culture's self-understanding.
The mass media and popular culture have been important arenas for
the dissemination of beliefs about the uses and abuses of litigation.' 8
"In these ... [arenas] 'people are suing each other with abandon.' A
twenty-five year old victim of 'improper parenting' seeks damages
from his mother and father. A customer having a 'bad hair day' sues
the beautician. A woman tries to dry her poodle in a microwave fol-
lowing a bath and demands compensation from the manufacturer for
the unhappy outcome. From these cases, the media constructs a cul-
ture of the 'hair trigger' litigation and 'legal hypochondria.' "a9 Several
notable efforts have been made to respond to these accounts and to
set the record straight by using the tools of social science to provide
what Marc Galanter has called, an "antidote to anecdote. o20 Not sur-
prisingly, there is little reason to believe that such efforts are fruitful,
or that social science prevails over popular culture representations.
The conviction that we are a distinctively, if not uniquely, litigious so-
ciety, and that the legal profession bears a large share of the blame for
this condition, persists.
If there is to be a persuasive alternative story, it must be con-
structed or identified within popular culture. It is with this belief in
mind that I present a reading of The Sweet Hereafter,21 a film that
depicts one example of how an alternative story may look. I turn to
film because law exists in a world of images whose power is not lo-
cated primarily in their representation of something exterior, but
rather within the images themselves. Samuel Weber observes, in his
16. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 13.
17. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 5 (1985). Total justice, Friedman argues, in-
volves "a general expectation of justice, and a general expectation of recompense for injuries
and loss." Id.
18. See Jack Anderson, U.S. Has Become a Nation of Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1985, at
B8.
19. Deborah Rhode, A Bad Press on Bad Lawyers: the Media Sees Research, Research Sees the
Media, in SOCIAL SCIENCE SOCIAL POuCYe AND LAW 139, 142 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999).
20. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093
(1996); see also Neil Vidmar, Maps, Gaps, Sociological Scholarship, and the Tort Reform Debate,
in SOCIAL SCIENCE SOCIAL POLICY AND LAW, supra note 19 at 170; Deborah Rhode, Too Much
Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989
(1998).
21. Of course, law also exists in the materialization of state power (see Robert Cover, Violence
and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986)) and in the meanings and messages constituted in, and
by, legal doctrine and the actions of legal officials. See Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories,
36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
[Vol. 50:425
2000] THE HIDDEN DOMAINS OF CIVIL JUSTICE 429
reading of Heidegger and Benjamin, that "the 'world' itself has be-
come a 'picture' whose ultimate function is to establish and confirm
the centrality of man as the being capable of depiction. '"22 In this age
of the world as a 'picture,' the proliferation of law in film, on televi-
sion, and in mass market publications, has altered and expanded the
sphere of legal life. 23 "Where else," Richard Sherwin asks, "can one
go but to the screen? It is where people look these days for reality ....
Turning our attention then to the recurring images and scenarios that
millions of people see projected daily on TV and silver screens across
the nation .... is no idle diversion." 24
The Sweet Hereafter provides a vehicle for understanding the man-
ner in which civil justice is mythologized in that world of images. The
Sweet Hereafter tells a story in words and pictures of the seldom seen
processes of naming, blaming, and claiming. The film positions law
against fate, thereby exposing the fragility and the power of law, as
well as the avoidance and allure of litigation. At this point, I am par-
ticularly interested in highlighting the exploration of the contingency
and variability in the reception of law's appeals that are presented in
The Sweet Hereafter. Through such an exploration, this film provides
one counterweight against media portraits of the much ballyhooed liti-
gation explosion.
The Sweet Hereafter also exemplifies the ways that film, as a me-
dium, always highlights the contingencies of our legal and social con-
ditions. Typically, films cast what Gary Morson calls a "sideshadow"
on "realities" outside itself,2 5 realities with which sociologists of law,
like the people we study, may have grown quite comfortable.2 6 Film is
not simply a mirror reflecting distorted legal and social realities.27
Rather, film always projects alternative realities which are made dif-
ferent by their filmic invention, or the editing and framing on which
film always depends. The viewing of projected images, no matter what
their subject matter, is a reminder that
[aliternatives always abound, and, more often than not, what exists
need not have existed .... Instead of casting a foreshadow from the
future, [they cast] .... a shadow 'from the side,' that is, from other
22. Samuel Weber, Mass Mediauras, or: Art, Aura, and Media in the Work of Walter Benjamin,
in WALTER BENJAMIN: THEORETICAL QUESTIONS 29 (David Ferris ed., 1996).
23. Today we have law on the books, law in action, and now, law in the image.
24. Richard K. Sherwin, Picturing Justice: Images of Law and Lawyers in the Visual Media, 30
U.S.F. L. REv., 894, 896 (1996).
25. GARY S. MORSON, NARRATIVE AND FREEDOM: THE SHADOWS OF TIME 117 (1994).
26. I am not claiming that film has a unique ability to sideshadow. Indeed almost any work of
fiction might be said to have this property as well.
27. VIVIAN SOBCHACK, THE ADDRESS OF THE EYE: A PHENOMENOLOGY OF FILM EXPERI-
ENCE 17 (1992).
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possibilities .... Sideshadows conjure [a] ghostly presence .... [in
which] the actual [what we know of the world] and the possible
[what film shows of that or other worlds] are made simultaneously
visible. [A] present moment subjected to sideshadowing ceases to
be Ptolemaic, the unchallenged center of things. It moves instead
into a Copernican universe: as there are many planets, so there are
many potential presents for each one actualized. 28
The moving image attunes us to the "might-have-beens" that have
shaped our worlds, as well as the "might-bes" against which our
worlds can be judged and toward which they might be pointed. In so
doing, film images contribute to both greater analytic clarity and polit-
ical sensibility in our treatments of law, whether they are in the hidden
domains of civil justice or elsewhere.
The Sweet Hereafter provides a close-up of the social dynamics that
inform reactions to the bus accident of various characters, such as par-
ents of children who die, parents of children who survive, the bus
driver, and most importantly, a lawyer, Mitchell Stephens. Simultane-
ously, a parallel story emerges, a story of Stephens's own troubled
relationship to his drug-addicted daughter Zoe. It is a narrative device
through which this film explores the complex connections of private
need and public action.
The Sweet Hereafter utilizes characters who are differently situated
in relation to the bus accident and the ensuing litigation to provide
other vantage points on the processes of naming, blaming, and claim-
ing. As a result, the film makes sideshadowing, a formal property of
film, into an important part of its own visual and narrative work. This
film fragments, pluralizes, and denaturalizes responses to tragedy.
Grief is given many faces and histories. While watching this film, we
confront the contingencies and possibilities of the hidden domains of
civil justice.
The film highlights the emergence and transformation of disputes as
a social, rather than a natural process, and a contingent, rather than an
inevitable event. The film reminds us of the different ways that loss
and suffering become part of the life stories of different people, with
some people accepting their fate and others insisting that causes be
identified, blame be assigned, and compensation be provided. The
film takes us behind the scenes, enabling us to see the roles lawyers
play in the processes of naming, blaming, and claiming. In addition,
the film makes law's polyvalent claims visible, while also exposing
law's own vulnerabilities. 29
28. MORSo N, supra note 25, at 118.
29. In mythological terms, law is fate, an all-powerful force, operating unpredictably, incom-
prehensibly, unaccountably, and imposing loss without explanation. This law is God command-
430 [Vol. 50:425
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The Sweet Hereafter addresses a complex array of fears, desires,
needs, and demands in our culture's imagining of law and litigation. 30
The film shows the appeal as well as the distasteful quality of litiga-
tion, the desires that move some toward the law and others away from
law. The film illustrates the fantasies of law's remedial power that sit
alongside our fears of the power that law exerts. This film tells two
stories at once, one is a story about the renaming of a misfortune in
the language of injustice, the other story is the resistance and refusal
of law in favor of the continuing claims of community over law, of
fatalism over blame. These stories provide a more subtle and compli-
cated portrait of the hidden domains of civil justice and the role of
litigation than is usually available in the imagined world of law. These
stories exemplify a popular culture narrative which is available to
counter the by now well-documented distortions and simplifications in
media and other popular culture representations of law and litigation.
II. WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT LITIGATION:
FROM MISFORTUNE TO INJUSTICE
In The Sweet Hereafter, Mitchell Stephens is law's primary image
and voice. Through him, the film tells the first story; through him, the
film displays the allure, but also the dangers of naming, blaming, and
claiming. At the beginning of the film, Stephens, and we with him,
enter a fallen world, a town in mourning. However, the law which
Stephens embodies, the law of personal injury litigation, has already
fallen and been discredited.31 The history and dominant fiction that
frames The Sweet Hereafter is represented by a town populated with
leftover hippies from the 1960s, families built around interracial adop-
tions, disabled people, and Vietnam veterans who have been turned
into single fathers and Allman Brothers "wanna-bes." In this town, we
see the aspirations of our age, to collect such differences and forge a
community.32 We see a town comfortable with its plurality and open
to the possibilities that plurality offers. However, as the film suggests,
such aspirations and comfort are indeed quite fragile.
ing Abraham, for seemingly no reason at all, to slay his innocent son. Law is fate entrapping
Oedipus in a tragic drama from which he cannot extricate himself. The law we live with, more
specifically, the positive law, is a mere shadow of law as fate, awesome in the power it can wield,
but shackled by the need to justify the power it does wield, and unable to forestall or undo fate
that befalls Abraham, Oedipus, or us, less-storied figures.
30. For a more complete exploration of these themes, see Austin Sarat, Imaging the Law of
the Father: Loss, Dread, and Mourning" in The Sweet Hereafter, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 3 (2000).
31. RHODE, supra note 19, at 142.
32. See Austin Sarat & Roger Berkowitz, Disorderly Differences: Recognition, Accommoda-
tion, and American Law, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN., 285 (1994).
2000]
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Stephens brings another history to this community. His history and
the community's present collide as he tries to introduce them to law's
distinctive way of responding to loss. Stephens represents the alien
presence of legality, with its habits of assigning guilt and constructing
hierarchy. Evoking the standard critique of litigation, the film suggests
that while the community survives the tragedy of the bus accident, it is
endangered by the law's presence, and its invitation to turn grief into
greed. A dread-inducing legality threatens to pit people against one
another, while transforming differences into advantage for some and
disadvantage for others. Rather than providing closure, the law
promises to prevent the healing of psychological wounds left behind
after the accident. And Stephens, continuously obsessesing about his
drug-addicted daughter, cajoles, pleads, and even gets down on his
knees in an attempt to convince the parents of the dead and injured
children to sue, thereby embodying the promises and the dangers of
this law.
How do we imagine the role of law in the hidden domains of civil
justice through such an icon? Stephens is unnervingly polyvocal and
chameleon-like. What he says and how he presents himself shifts as he
moves from place to place, more specifically, from potential plaintiff
to potential plaintiff. Stephens is a seducer of the weak, preying on the
human vulnerabilities and needs which his finely tuned legal sensibili-
ties can discover in a minute. Nonetheless, these very attributes re-
mind us of the plurality and possibility, which, in this case, may lie
below the surface of a dread-inducing, community-destroying legality.
To some of the town's parents, Stephens offers dignity and status.
Stephens treats the parents as the embodiment of the community's
values and its respectability, even as he invites them to gossip about
their neighbors' debts, defects, and criminal records. To other people,
Stephens holds out different hopes, promises, and benefits, if they join
his "cause." Some of Stephens's promises and ploys are predictable,
others are surprising, even counter-intuitive. However, this approach
only marks our distance from Stephens, the gap between common
sense and the sharply-honed legal mind, and it arouses fear of a law
that can see through us and identify precisely our needs and
vulnerabilities. 33
33. Thus, Stephens offers money to Sam, who readily and eagerly wants to profit from his
daughter's pain. To Nicole, Stephens suggests that the lawsuit will transform her from a pitiful
victim to agent, that it will enable her to act in a way that will stop people from seeing her only
as a "cripple." Stephens makes this pitch by identifying with those who see her only that way. "I
don't like to think about the accident," Nicole tells Stephens. "I don't even remember it happen-
ing. Besides it just makes people feel sorry for me," she says. "You hate that," Stephens replies,
"[P]eople can't help it. They see you in this wheelchair and they are going to feel sorry for you. I
[Vol. 50:425
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A. The Promise of Respectability
Stephens's first contact with the town's citizens arises when he
checks into the Bide-A-Wile Motel, a dingy and disheveled place run
by Risa and Wendell Walker, who are themselves parents of one of
the children killed in the bus accident. Wendell, an overweight, un-
shaven, unpleasant man, first thinks that Stephens is another of the
reporters who recently descended on the town. However, Stephens
corrects Wendell by stating, "I'm a lawyer. I realize that this is an
awful time, but it is important that we talk."
Stephens soon engages the Walkers in a conversation about their
neighbors and other parents who lost children in the accident. En-
couraged by Stephens, Wendell eagerly plays the role of the town gos-
sip, telling Stephens about the drinking and domestic problems of
others in the town. "Kyle Mastersons' a drunk," says Wendell, begin-
ning a snarling monologue that invites viewers to wonder whether
what he says about Kyle is also true of himself, "no one likes him.
He's a nasty piece of work." Risa joins in the gossip sporadically, re-
luctantly, and sympathetically, adding that Kyle spends too much time
at the local bar, that he feels "trapped by his life," that he blames "his
wife for that, and... "Wendell triumphantly interjects, "and he beat
her!" Talking later about another victim's father, Wendell tells Ste-
phens, "everybody knows that Joey steals antiques from summer cot-
tages and sells them to dealers in the city. He has been doing that for
years."
Stephens responds approvingly, posing the needs of law against the
bonds of community solidarity. Stephens states, "that's right Wendell.
That's exactly what I need to know so it won't come back to haunt our
case later on." Stephens not only encourages the gossip, but treats the
Walkers, who themselves hardly seem to be paragons of virtue, as
model citizens, by telling them, "you see to do this right, to actually
have a chance of winning, of getting some money to compensate you
for the loss of your boy, we need folks like you, sensitive, loving par-
ents, with no criminal backgrounds, no history of trouble in the town."
Stephens brands the Walkers as arbiters of respectability, asking them
to judge the character and reputation of the townspeople. Stephens
then asks, "now of the people you have told me about, whose kids
were killed, who do you consider to be good, upstanding neighbors,
people who will help us with our cause?"
didn't even know you and how exciting your life was before the accident and even I feel sorry for
you."
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Soon Risa brings up another family, a family she admires, the Ottos.
She tells Stephens this couple lost an adopted Indian son, Bear.
"That's good," Stephens responds in a cynical, realist moment,
"Judges like adopted Indian boys. Tell me more about the Ottos. '34
Risa praises the Ottos' intelligence and devotion to their son, but
Wendell interrupts, insisting that the Ottos use drugs. With this state-
ment, the bitterness lurking below the surface of the Walkers' rela-
tionship erupts, and they begin to argue. Just then Stephens' cell
phone rings, and he excuses himself as he walks out of the living room
into the adjoining corridor. Viewers then hear snippets of the Walkers'
argument, catching a few muffled phrases just as Stephens might have
heard the argument. The scene dissolves as we watch Stephens inch
gradually closer to the room from which he just departed, in order to
eavesdrop. Stephens then overhears Wendell state, "did you hear
what that man said. He said good, good Wendell .... "
In his encounter with the Walkers, Stephens is, on the surface,
smooth and controlled, the well-dressed, successful, big-city lawyer.
Stephens plays well to his audience, offering Wendell the kind of at-
tention that he rarely gets, and investing in the Walkers the type of
social status that they hardly seem to deserve. At the same time, Ste-
phens explains the law's interest in the character and reputation of
litigants without mentioning the merits of their case. Finally, Stephens
shows viewers a glimpse into the way he practices law, as he tries to
overhear a conversation that clearly was not intended for his ears.
When viewers later learn that Stephens's pitch worked and the Walk-
ers have retained him, we are left to wonder whether it was the fact
that he treated them with respect and offered them respectability that
moved them to join the "case" and the "cause."
B. "There's No Such Thing as an Accident"
There is, however, nothing subtle or indirect, nothing for the viewer
to wonder about in the manner that Stephens approaches the Ottos,
or in the way he attempts to engage them in the process of naming,
blaming, and claiming. If respectability was the major currency of Ste-
phens's appeal to the Walkers, to the Ottos he promises the restora-
tion of order in a disorderly world, the substitution of blame and
responsibility for fatalism and acceptance. This is the classic call of
total justice, "the general expectation that somebody will pay for any
and all calamities that happen to a person..., that there ought to be
34. On the pervasiveness of such cynical realism about law, see AusTIN SARAT & WILLIAM
FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND TimER CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PRO-
cuss 85-107 (1995).
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some sort of redress. '35 However, unlike the Walkers, who quickly
succumb to the allures of litigation and assume the role that Stephens
offers them, the Ottos, especially Mrs. Otto, put up a fierce, if ulti-
mately futile, resistance.
STEPHENS WITH THE OTTOS3 6
In an extended and rather claustrophobic scene shot inside their A-
frame home, the camera focuses closely on the faces of Stephens and
Mrs. Otto, the former focused earnestly on his prey, the latter deeply
pained and saddened. Introducing himself to Mrs. Otto, Stephens
mentions the Walkers, citing information that they supposedly told
him, information that the film's viewers know to be false.
STEPHENS: Mrs. Otto, my name is Mitchell Stephens. The Walkers
told me that you might be willing to talk to me. I'm sorry for coming
unannounced like this, but the Walkers said you'd understand. It's
an awful time, but it is important that we talk. The Walkers spoke
very highly of you.
35. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 43.
36. Images reproduced herein have been expressly authorized by Camellia Frieberg, producer
and copyright holder of The Sweet Hereafter. The Sweet Hereafter is copyrighted by New Line
Cinema, Alliance Atlantis International, and Camellia Frieberg.
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MRS. OTro: You've been retained?
STEPHENS: Yes.
MRS. OTro: Their child dies and they got a lawyer?
That final comment is the voice of fate, "[t]heir child dies and they got
a lawyer," expressing incredulity that someone who lost a child would
turn to the law.
However, Stephens artfully acknowledges the limits of the law and
of the services he can provide, even as he searches for something with
which to engage Mrs. Otto.
STEPHENS: It should be said that my task is to represent the Walkers
only in their anger, not their grief.
MRS. OTro: Who do they get for that?
STEPHENS: You are angry aren't you Mrs. Otto. That's why I'm here
to give your anger a voice, to be your weapon against whoever
caused the bus to go off the road.
Anger, not grief, is the material used to create a lawsuit. Recogniz-
ing and fueling that anger is essential for the lawyer seeking to gener-
ate a suit. In order to accomplish this goal, Stephens makes the type of
appeal that Judith Shklar says is crucial in the movement from misfor-
tune to injustice, introducing the idea that a human agent caused the
accident. As Shklar notes, "most people hate to think of themselves as
victims; after all, nothing could be more degrading. Most of us would
rather reorder reality than admit that we are the helpless objects of
injustice. '37
This reordering continues as Stephens refocuses Mrs. Otto's initial
identification of the responsible agent, away from the bus driver, to-
ward a more financially lucrative target. Stephens states, "it is my be-
lief that Delores [the bus driver] was doing exactly what she's been
doing for years. Besides the school board's insurance on Delores was
minimal. No, the really deep pockets are in the town or the company
that made the bus." These lines represent caricatures of the attitude
that critics of the litigation explosion argue is typical of the plaintiff's
personal injury bar, namely, that blaming follows judgments about the
value of potential recovery. 38 Nevertheless, these comments barely
engage Mrs. Otto.
Mrs. Otto asks, "do you think someone else caused the accident Mr.
Stephens?" Again, Stephens offers up an almost pure rendition of the
difference between misfortune and injustice, simultaneously battling
37. SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 38.
38. See HUBER, supra note 13, at 79-80. "Behind every great fortune there is a great crime,
Balzac once said. New tort practitioners managed to reverse things entirely. Searching for the
fortune came first; a crime would then be found, one way or another, in the vicinity of the cash."
Id.
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fatalism with an ethic of blame and responsibility. Stephens represents
the world of tortfeasors as a cold world of cost-benefit calculation in
which the plaintiff's lawyer is the moral hero.
Mrs. Otto, there is no such thing as an accident. The word doesn't
mean anything to me. As far as I'm concerned somebody, some-
where made a decision to cut a corner, some corrupt agency or cor-
poration counted the cost variance of a ten cent bolt and a million
dollar out-of-court settlement. They decided to sacrifice a few lives
for the difference. That's what is done, Mrs. Otto. I've seen it hap-
pen so many times before .... Somebody calculated ahead of time
what it would cost to sacrifice safety. It is the darkest most cynical
thing you could imagine. But it is absolutely true. And now it is up
to me to insure moral responsibility in this society? 39
"There is no such thing as an accident," surely this is one of law's
most powerful stories, comforting in its assurance that cause and ef-
fect always can be identified, blame assigned, and fair compensation
assessed. 40 Law offers its own distinctive forms for responding to pain;
it refuses fate and promises to make the mysterious comprehensible.
Law asks us to substitute reason for faith, and to act in this world
against forces that threaten to overwhelm us. What Stephens offers to
Mrs. Otto is an account of a world that makes sense, horrible, horrify-
ing sense perhaps, but sense nonetheless. In this world, events have
causes, human agents make the world what it is, even if they hide in
the background, sometimes dimly perceived if perceived at all, when
things go wrong. As Shklar explains,
We blame ourselves and each other unjustly simply to avoid
Voltaire's conclusion that the world is a mass of random evil, of bad
luck. Even impersonal, shared, tangled responsibility without a face
is too much to bear .... Behind every disaster there must be ill-will
and fault, and their consequences do not just happen. They are de-
39. Stephens's speech might well have been addressed to his own life, to the dreadful question
of why Stephens's daughter Zoe, in spite of all the advantages brought by wealth and two appar-
ently loving parents, became a drug addict. While Stephens is tormented by the question of why
Zoe turned out as she did, he invites the film's viewers to ask whether what he says might be
applied to his own life. If there is no such thing as an accident, is Stephens himself responsible
for his daughter's drug addiction? Did this father on trial in the distinctive juridical space of the
moving image cut corners in the way he raised Zoe? Is he more like the good father (Billy
Ansel) whose child is inexplicably, unfairly taken from him? Or, like Sam, who loses his child
because of his own bad acts? Or is he caught up in the conventionally defined roles of father-
hood, the contingency of which is made visible in the multiple characterizations of fatherhood
that the film provides? Is he so bound by them that the way he fathers mirrors the way he
practices law? For an extended treatment of these questions, see, e.g., SARAT, supra note 30, at
26.
40. Exploring the significance of the discourse of responsibility in the face of death, Derrida
notes that some believe that "the reign of responsibility and, along with its freedom [sic] consists
perhaps of a triumph over death, in other words a triumph of life." JACQUES DERRIDA, THE
Gn'r OF DEATH 16 (David Wills trans., 1995).
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signed to occur, by ourselves and powerful others. Injustice makes
sense, and we can cope with it and carry on .... Someone simply
must be blamed to maintain the unquenchable belief in a rational
world.4 1
Even in the face of this reordering appeal, Mrs. Otto is not easily
convinced. She persists in refusing law's invitation to reorder her
world in the categories of guilt and blame. Mrs. Otto asks sarcasti-
cally, "so you are just the thing we need?" She continues, "isn't that
what you want us to believe Mr. Stephens, that you know what is best
for us?"
Stephens is unfazed by Mrs. Otto's attack. It is as if he has seen and
heard it all before. Crawling toward her on his hands and knees, he
responds directly, that in fact he does "know what is best," that the
other side is lining up lawyers to take advantage of the town's "grief-
stricken parents." Finally, Stephens appeals to his own anger as he
reiterates the reality of blame and responsibility. Stephens states, "if
everyone had done their job with integrity, your son would be alive
and safely in school this morning .... Now that makes me very, very
mad."
As Mrs. Otto breaks down, overcome by the invitation to imagine
the quotidian reality of her son alive in school, Stephens continues, his
words quickening as if sensing her vulnerability. Stephens states, "I
promise that I will pursue and reveal who it was that didn't do their
job, who is responsible for this tragedy, and then in your name, the
Walkers' name, and in the name of anyone else who decides to join us,
I will sue. I will sue for negligence until they bleed."
Throughout this speech, the tone of Stephens's voice and the close-
ups of his face are crucial, revealing lawyers as consummate actors,
moving from shouts to whispers, from compassion to indignation, in a
seemingly effortless and sincere expression of emotion. When Mrs.
Otto finally bursts forth with her previously unspeakable wish that
"whoever did this" should go to jail "for the rest of his life," Stephens
moves easily to another register, calmly reigning her in, explaining, as
if completing a primer on the law of torts and its purposes, that
it is unlikely that anyone will go to prison. But her or his company
will pay in other ways and we must make him pay, not for the
money for the compensation for your lost boy. That can't be done,
but for the protection of other innocent children. You see, I'm not
just here to speak for your anger, but for the future as well.
This scene, which consumes more than eight minutes, is of a length
which underlines its dramatic importance in the first story of the hid-
41. SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 54.
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den domains of civil justice. The story of law's seemingly irresistible
gravitational attraction ends with Mrs. Otto inquiring about the cost
of Stephens's services. After he explains the way contingency fees
work, he momentarily seems to pull back, showing human considera-
tion and concern, suggesting that "you should have a chance to discuss
this without me before you make a decision." However, this moment
is quickly undercut as we watch Stephens put on his coat and race to
his car to get a retainer agreement for the Ottos to sign.
C. Suits and Seductions
In the scene with the Ottos, The Sweet Hereafter makes the hard
work of transforming fatalism into blaming vivid and visible. How-
ever, no such work is necessary with Sam, whose participation in the
suit is unexplored in the film because it is simply taken for granted.
We are shown no appeals to his needs for respectability, for the resto-
ration of order in the face of tragedy, or for anything else. Sam, the
father of one of the few children, Nicole, who survives the accident, is
Stephens's most eager client and his spiritual ally in the film. With
regard to the lawsuit, Sam seems concerned only with money, asking
Stephens at a particularly awkward and inappropriate moment in the
film, "when do they award the damages?"
However, interestingly enough, Sam is also guilty of sexually mo-
lesting his daughter. This act of incest and the way Nicole comes to
terms with it, play out as a parallel and ultimately intersecting narra-
tive with the story of the accident and the lawsuit.42 This parallel is
suggested in a scene where Sam and Nicole are being briefed by Ste-
phens about an upcoming deposition. Nicole, almost too eagerly vol-
unteers that "I won't lie .... No matter what I'm asked I'll tell the
truth." The camera then shifts quickly to Sam, as his eyes, registering
his uncertainty and anxiety about the meaning of her promise, dart in
Nicole's direction.43
Having presented himself to the Walkers as pursuing a "cause," and
to Ottos as a man on a mission, filled with righteous indignation, play-
42. As Atom Egoyan, the film's screen writer and director, stated, "[t]here are two primary
scenes of 'catastrophe' in The Sweet Hereafter. The first, an image of incest between Nicole...
and Sam ... is almost completely sublimated .... The school-bus accident, in contrast to the
incest scene, is the catastrophe that the viewer of The Sweet Hereafter must anticipate." Atom
Egoyan, Recovery, in 7 SiG-rr & SouND 20, 21 (1997).
43. Still later, Sam's fear is registered when they talk in Nicole's room. Nicole's monosyllabic,
non-responsiveness to his questions, leads Sam to note that she "seems distant." Her distance,
her withdrawal empowers her just as it unnerves him. Nicole exercises her dread-inducing power
when she evokes the scene of incest by calling on Sam to "[r]emember, Daddy, the beautiful
stage you were going to build for me. You were going to light it with nothing but candles."
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ing a key part in a morality tale of good battling evil, Stephens
changes his tactic when dealing with Nicole, whom he mistakenly be-
lieves to be fragile and fearful. In this situation, the language of cause
is put aside; anger and indignation is displaced as Stephens tries to
reassure her that the lawsuit is simply a matter of people doing their
jobs. Discussing what the defense lawyers will do in the deposition,
Stephens emotionlessly says,
[tihey work for the people that we are trying to sue. Their job is to
try to minimize damages and ours is to try to maximize them. That's
the way you have to think of it as people doing their jobs. There's
no good guys or bad guys. There's just their side and our side.
These shifting appeals serve not only to implant doubts about Ste-
phens in the film's viewers, but they remind us that naming, blaming,
and claiming do not occur naturally. Rather, these concepts are as-
pects of the social lives we lead, and are often dialogic events in which
appeals and audiences play key roles in overcoming doubt.44
The Sweet Hereafter offers its viewers a clear parallel between Ste-
phens effort to convince the citizens of the small town to litigate, and
Sam's incestuous seduction of his daughter. In creating this parallel,
the film speaks to the first story of civil justice, the story of the move-
ment from misfortune to injustice, the story of naming, blaming, and
claiming, joining critics in the media and popular culture who warn of
the dangers of litigation. The parallel between the suit and the seduc-
tion is drawn in many ways, the most powerful of which involves the
use of a fable, The Pied Piper of Hamelin,45 which is narrated gradu-
ally and intermittently, often in voice-over by Nicole. The lawsuit and
the fable both pose a grave threat to the town and its children. The
idea that the suit is itself a kind of seduction, and that Stephens is a
dangerous seducer, is suggested by the many different appeals that
Stephens makes, appeals in which he positions himself in sometimes
contradictory ways. While none of the characters recognize the con-
tradictions we do. Viewers watch Stephens engage, first one and then
another of the potential plaintiffs, in a colloquy about the accident
and its aftermath. Beware of the lawyer making promises.
44. Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Dis-
putes, 15 LAW & Soc'y REv. 775 (1980-81).
45. Robert Browning, TiH PIED PIPER OF HAMELIN, EVERYMAN'S CHILDREN'S CLASSICS
(Bracken Books 1993), see also GRAHAM ANDERSON, FAIRYTALE IN Tim ANCIENT WORLD 133
(Routledge 2000).
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III. RESISTING THE ALLURE OF LITIGATION: FATALISM AND
FIDELITY IN THE FACE OF MISFORTUNE
As The Sweet Hereafter appears to join the chorus of critics warning
that the pull of litigation is irresistible, its allure as dangerous as the
"romantic" exploitation of a young girl by her father, the film under-
cuts this narrative by introducing another story, one of a community's
triumph over law and fatalism's resistance to the language of blame.
These interweaving stories remind us of the contingency and variabil-
ity of responses to tragedy, reactions to law, and of the uncertainty of
law's seemingly alluring appeal. Fatalism is not so easily or surely
overcome; loyalties are not so easily dislodged. As powerful as the
promise of substituting a tale of injustice for a tale of misfortune
might be, the film shows that doubt is not always overcome, and se-
ductions do not always succeed, because other voices and forces inter-
vene to short-circuit the process of naming, blaming, and claiming.
Law is as often defeated as it is successful in offering itself as the cor-
rect response to pain and suffering.
A. Who Can Judge?
The second story, the counter-narrative of the hidden domains of
civil justice, begins with Delores, the steadfast, sensitive, childless
woman who drove the bus the day of the accident, with the same lov-
ing attention to the town's children that she had shown in driving the
bus everyday for fifteen years. Delores's pain and suffering are made
visible in several ways. First, they are revealed in the way she is posi-
tioned when we initially see her sitting in her living room. Delores is
in front of a wall covered with framed photographs of children, whose
gentle faces we see long before we learn that they are the town's chil-
dren, who it had been her special pleasure to care for and drive. Other
visible evidence of her injuries are a neck brace and a splint on her
wrist. Still, another badge of the suffering in her life is Abbott, her
husband, confined to a wheelchair by a stroke, who sits quietly just
inside the right of the frame as Delores is shown conversing with Ste-
phens about the accident. Nevertheless, it is to the photographs on the
wall that the camera continually draws our attention, suggesting by its
insistent focus that Delores has lost all of her children. 46
46. Thus, as she speaks slowly and tenderly about the Ottos, testifying to their good character
and talking in the present tense about their love for Bear, the camera gives a close-up of his
photograph hung in her living room.
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DELORES, ABBOTT, AND STEPHENS
The film assigns Delores a special narrative role, first taking us to,
then away from, and later back to Stephens's effort to enlist her as a
plaintiff. Almost an hour into the film, Delores begins to provide Ste-
phens, and through him the film's viewers, the first description of the
events leading up to the accident. However, even as she recounts the
event, her tender regard for the town's children is again conveyed.
By the time I reached the bottom of Bartlett Hill Road, I had half
my load, Let's see, twenty, no twenty-two kids aboard. They'd walk
to their places on the main road from the smaller lanes and private
roadways. Bright little clusters of three or four children, like berries
waiting to be plucked. That's the way I thought of them sometimes
.... like I was putting them into my big basket, clearing the hillside
of its children.
This tender regard sits uneasily alongside her concern that she will
be blamed for the accident, and her doubt that her innocence can be
proven. In an effort Stephen attempts to reassure Delores Stephens
says that
STEPHENS: Billy Ansel (who was driving behind the bus at the time
of the accident) will insist that you were doing 50 miles per hour just
like you've been doing every morning for fifteen years.
DELORES: He knows that, Billy?
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STEPHENS: Yes he does.
DELORES: He said that?
STEPHENS: Um-Hmm.
DELORES: You talked to Billy?
STEPHENS: Yes I did.
However, what is reassuring for Delores is unnerving for the film's
viewers, who again are privy to Stephens's duplicity, already having
seen that Billy has refused to talk with Stephens about anything hav-
ing to do with the accident.
Stephens quickly moves to enlist Delores in the process of naming,
blaming, and claiming, offering to represent her in a suit charging
"negligent infliction of emotional harm." Stephens says that she must
join the Walkers, the Ottos, and Sam, in assigning blame for her suf-
fering and making a claim for redress. This time he insists that what is
at stake is her good name, her reputation, her very place in the com-
munity. Stephens states, "Delores, people have to know about your
suffering. They won't understand until I can clear your name once and
for all."
At this point, Abbott interrupts, introducing a story of community
against law. His presence represents the disabled, almost silenced,
outsider. Abbott seems quite disturbed as he emits a seemingly
unintelligible stream of noises. However, what is unintelligible to Ste-
phens and the film's viewers, is quite intelligible to Delores who trans-
lates as if she was the parent of a toddler whose first words have
meaning only to her. Abbott, inarticulately, but powerfully, reaches
out to Delores, sounding the alarm, reminding her of a set of values
that she might have been tempted to forget burdened as she is by
sadness and fear. "You heard what Abbott said," Delores says quite
unselfconsciously, as if what he said was in need of no translation.
Delores continues, "Abbott said that the true jury of a person's peers
is the people of her town. Only they, the people who have known her
all her life and not twelve strangers can decide her guilt or innocence."
Law is overcome by belief in, and loyalty to, the community. The
lawyer's articulateness is defeated by scrambled noise, a voice from
another place. What Abbott says to Delores reminds her, and the
film's viewers, that her type of innocence cannot be proven, that there
are things for which law can provide no effective redress. She will ei-
ther be believed or she will not be. In order to know the truth of her
role in the events surrounding the bus accident, one must know her
and her character. Law, embodied in a jury of twelve strangers, can-
not, unlike the film's viewers, be inside the bus during the accident.
Law cannot recapture the truth of what happened in the bus. Law
does not have a God's eye view. As a result, law can no more restore
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her reputation, than it can restore the lives of the children she has lost.
Delores's only possibility of redemption is to resist the law, to blame
no one, and to claim nothing. Her ability to accomplish this goal, ex-
emplifies the fragility of law's offer of blame, responsibility, compen-
sation, and exoneration; an offer overcome by Abbott and Delores's
fidelity to an ideal of community which sustains their lives.
When viewers see Delores giving a deposition, recounting the hor-
ror of the accident, stating that the bus was "like a huge wave about to
break over us," we are reminded of the gap between her world and
the world of law. Delores sobs as she particularizes the "us," by nam-
ing every child on the bus. The panning of the camera from Delores to
Stephens, who sits impassively toying with a ring on his finger, ignor-
ing her distress as he asks matter-of-factly, "and then what hap-
pened," suggests that the gap is truly unbridgeable.
B. "Leave Us Alone"
Billy Ansel, Vietnam veteran, garage mechanic, widowed parent of
two, seems to be the classic embodiment of certain traditional male
virtues. He is sturdy, unrefined and self-reliant. However, he is so de-
voted to his children, so eager to protect them, that everyday he fol-
lows the school bus waving to them until they reach their destination.
He is, in addition, Stephens' greatest adversary as Stephens tries to
convince grieving parents to sue; Billy is the most important voice of
resistance and of refusal to law's invitation to name, blame, and claim.
The Sweet Hereafter goes out of its way to show that Billy's qualities
as a father afford him no protection against the tragedy that befalls his
community. Thus, it is through Billy's eyes that we first see the acci-
dent. We watch as he helplessly witnesses the bus skid off the road and
slide down a hill onto the frozen lake.47 We register the horror of the
sound of ice cracking and the sight of the bus slowly sinking, simulta-
neously with Billy.48 The camera then sweeps skyward, marking the
ascent of souls departing for the sweet hereafter, and suddenly cuts to
the ethereal image of the sleeping family of the young Mitchell Ste-
phens. This cut is unsettling, marking the short and uncertain distance
from sleeping innocence to unfathomable human tragedy.
47. This shot provides one example of the way the camera focuses attention upon "the look
rather than its object" and in so doing "brings the look emphatically within the spectacle." KAJA
SILVERMAN, MALE SUBJECTIVrrY AT THE MARGINS 131 (1992).
48. "I felt," Egoyan explains, "it was imperative to shoot the accident from the vantage point
of the widower Billy Ansel .... as he experienced it. I believed that this would .... situate it, like
the incest scene, within a primary character's point of view." See Egoyan, supra note 42, at 23
(emphasis in original).
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Yet, this is not Billy's first confrontation with loss. Billy's wife ear-
lier died of cancer, and Billy becomes an example of what Kaja
Silverman claims to be true of male characters in other films. As a
result of Billy's confrontation with his own "lack .... [he] acquires the
capacity to become something other than what the male subject has
classically been. ' 49 But it is not Billy as father figure that is critical in
The Sweet Hereafter's exploration of the hidden domains of civil jus-
tice, and of the contingency and variability of naming, blaming, and
claiming. Rather, the crucial role is seen in Billy's resistance to
Stephens.
Billy's resistance is presented in three separate scenes. The first
scene, a brief interlude, takes place after the bus accident at the scene
of his regular assignations with Risa Walker. On this occasion, how-
ever, there is no intimacy, only a shared grief accompanied by a seri-
ous disagreement about how to respond to the tragedy. The
disagreement between the two begins when Billy asks Risa whether it
is true that she has signed up with Stephens. Mimicking words we
know Stephens has said to others, Risa answers, "something made this
happen Billy, and Mr. Stephens said he's going to find out." Billy in-
sists, contra Stephens, "it was an accident."
Billy is willing, and able, despite the depth of his suffering, to live in
a world in which accidents happen. A world where one can neither
predict nor respond to fate, and where reason points to the limits of
reason. Thus, Billy reminds Risa that he serviced the bus and knew
that there was nothing wrong with it. However, she persists, "the
guardrail wasn't strong enough." At this point, Billy's cold disdain
shows through as he asks, "you believe that?" Risa responds, "I have
to." Billy exclaims, "well, I don't," and in words reminiscent of some
of Shklar's own analysis, he says, "maybe you should get yourself [a]
witch doctor, not a lawyer, or maybe they are the same thing. '50
The second scene of Billy's resistance to naming, blaming, and
claiming occurs in his only direct confrontation with his nemesis, Ste-
phens. In this pivotal scene, Billy returns to his gas station and auto
repair garage, where the salvaged bus is being kept, to find Stephens
moving around inside the bus, video camera in hand. Oblivious to
what it represents, Stephens treats the bus as just another piece of
evidence that needs to be preserved for use in future litigation, walk-
49. SILVERMAN, supra note 47, at 155.
50. As Shklar says, "[w]itchcraft is as good an answer to 'Why me?' as any .... Witchcraft...
clearly integrates misfortune into an existing social and moral framework and warns people
against giving way to malice." SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 62.
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ing around and defiling the tomb in which the dead childrens' spirits
reside.
ANSEL AND STEPHENS
Billy, on the other hand, approaches the bus reverently, taking off
his hat, staring at the smashed back door from which his kids waved
every morning as he followed the bus to school. Discovering Stephens,
he approaches him menacingly, orders him to "get the fuck away from
the bus," and announces his intention to "beat you [Stephens] so bad
until you piss blood and can't walk for a month." Stephens is, how-
ever, undeterred by these threats; "I can help you," he calmly states.
Nonetheless, Billy's response marks the world in which he lives, a
world where there can be no earthly compensation for the loss of
one's children. "Not unless you can raise the dead."
However, Billy quickly moves from this posture of existential ac-
ceptance, fatalism in the face of loss, to one in which he allies himself
with the community and its interests, acting as its protector even as he
expresses deep incredulity that his neighbors would use the law to re-
spond to their loss.
BILLY: You leave the people of this town alone. You can't help.
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STEPHENS: You can help each other. Several people in the town
have agreed to let me represent them in a negligence suit. Your case
as an individual will be stronger if I'm allowed to represent you
together.
BILLY: Case?
STEPHENS: The Walkers have agreed. The Ottos have agreed. Ni-
cole's parents.
BILLY: Listen, I know Risa and Wendell Walker. They wouldn't hire
a goddamn lawyer. The Ottos, they wouldn't deal with you. We're
not country bumpkins you can put the big city hustle on.
STEPHENS: You are angry, Mr. Ansel, and you owe it to yourself to
feel that way. All I'm saying is let me direct your rage.
At this point, Stephens' cell phone rings, but this time he does not
answer. Instead, he uses the call to appeal to Billy, an attempt to iden-
tify with him as a father in mourning. Stephens enlists his private suf-
fering as a tactic in his professional work. Stephens states, "it's my
daughter, or it may be the police to tell me they have found her dead.
She's a drug addict." Whatever its meaning to Bill, this speech reflects
Stephens's own grief, bewilderment, and vulnerability. Stephens con-
tinues, "why am I telling you this, Mr. Ansel? Because we've all lost
our children. They're dead to us. They're killing each other in the
streets. They wander comatose through shopping malls."
However, Billy is so unmoved by this effort at identification that he
simply puts on his hat and walks away. Unlike his neighbors, he has
seen through Stephens, the witch doctor using all the tricks at his dis-
posal to cast a spell. The only safe response is exit. Billy's exit shows
that he is strong enough to confront loss, and to live and grieve in a
world he can neither fully understand nor control. 51 Billy refuses to
believe that law can aid mourning, make the irrational rational, or
make the accidental have a cause. His strength is a measure of the
law's weakness, a reminder that law is indeed not irresistible, that liti-
gation is neither the necessary nor the inexorable response to injury,
that the quest for total justice is not all encompassing.
As Billy leaves, Stephens turns his eyes skyward, as if addressing a
different audience, and continues, "something terrible has happened.
It has taken our children away. It is too late. They're gone." In this
moment, the distinction between public and private completely disap-
pears. The lawyer is just another frightened, confused father, vulnera-
ble to the very loss to which his professional work is now responding.
Just as Stephens can do nothing for the children who died or for their
51. What Derrida says about the biblical Abraham is also true of Billy Ansel. They both rec-
ognize that "even if one thinks one knows what is going to happen, the new instant of that
happening remains untouched, still unaccessible, in fact unlivable." DERRIDA, supra note 40, at
54.
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surviving parents, he is overwhelmed by the fear that Zoe is also
"gone," that it is "too late" for her as well. At this point, Stephens
momentarily acknowledges the weakness of law before a fate whose
workings he can neither understand nor control.
The third scene of Billy's resistance to naming, blaming, and claim-
ing occurs late in the film when he goes to see Sam. This scene is a
classic confrontation between good and evil, between fidelity and
greed, played out over the question of the fate of the lawsuit. In this
conversation, we see Billy's dread before the law, his desperate desire
to avoid entanglement with it and its traumatic repetition, even as he
appeals to Sam to drop the suit.52 Through Billy, law is shown to con-
tain its own excesses and to stand in the way of the healing that comes
with the completion of mourning.5 3 Billy conjures a legal world gone
awry, a world in which one misstep can have catastrophic
consequences.
I don't want a darn thing to do with it. Lawyers are suing lawyers,
[and] people are pointing fingers at each other and making side
deals and dickering over percentages. He [Stephens] is going to
force me to testify in court. I was driving behind the bus and I saw it
happen. He's going to force me to go over all this again. Then all
those other lawyers are going to line up behind him and try to do
the same thing.54
Billy insists that if Sam drops the suit, others will do so as well, and
he offers to give Sam the money he received from the school board's
liability insurance on Delores. Yet, Billy's ultimate, and ultimately un-
successful, appeal is to the ethic of mutual aid that he insists previ-
ously animated their town. For Delores, the community is the only
true source of judgment, and for Billy, the community and only the
community, is an appropriate source of assistance. Billy states, "I
could pay for Nicole if that is what you are really talking about. I'll
even give you the money I got for my kids. That's what we used to do,
remember, help each other cause this was a community."
52. Trauma is "the response to an unexpected or overwhelming violent event or events that
are not fully grasped as they occur, but return in repeated flashbacks, nightmares, and other
repetitive phenomena." CATHY CARUTH, UNCLAIMED EXPERIENCE: TRAuMA, NARRATrIvE, AND
HISTORY 91 (1996).
53. For a different view of the capacity of law to help the healing process after traumatic
events, see MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AF-
TER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 61-70 (1998).
54. Saying "I saw it happen," Billy reminds us that, we too, saw it happen. This reminder
provokes viewers to retrieve their own experience of witnessing the bus go off the road and to
imagine the dread of having to re-live that event in a rhythm and manner which, while it may
stand in the way of completing the work of mourning, is nonetheless what the law requires.
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Billy's unsuccessful attempt to dissuade Sam is crucial to the dra-
matic unfolding of the film and to the full articulation of its second
story, enabling another voice to enter the conversation about naming,
blaming, and claiming. 55 Thus, while the good father turns out to be
powerless before the Pied Piper of law, Nicole is not. Nicole's role in
articulating the second story, the story of refusal and resistance, and
her power over law, is revealed late in the film when she gives her
deposition. We watch her sitting near Sam and Stephens, as a defense
lawyer asks questions about her recollection of the accident. "I re-
member it clearly now," Nicole asserts, "see we were going too fast
down the hill and I was scared. The speedometer was large and easy to
read from where I was sitting . . . [Delores] was going 72 miles an
hour."
Since Nicole's testimony, which the film's viewers knows to be a lie,
places blame on the person with the shallowest pockets, it effectively
ends the suit. The testimony serves as a satisfying (at least for us, if not
for Nicole) act of revenge against Sam, depriving him of the money he
so desperately wants, but also as a means of exposing the weakness
and vulnerability of law. Sam substitutes for Stephens, Nicole for Zoe,
and all of Stephens's legal acumen, all his work, is defeated and de-
railed by a teenaged girl, who, like Stephens, works out a private con-
flict in a public setting.
Stephens tells Sam, "[t]he lawsuit is dead. Everyone's lawsuit is
dead. It's over," announcing Nicole's symbolic castration of them
both. The lie that kills the lawsuit is, however, not only an act of re-
venge; it is also an act of love. Through her lie, Nicole saves Billy from
the law he so deeply dreads, and she asserts the priority of ethics over
duty. 56 At the same time, Nicole represents the Pied Piper, exacting
vengeance in response to the "sins" of fathers, and the lame child sav-
ing Billy, her village, and ultimately herself from the Piper.57
Emphasizing Nicole's empowerment and the importance of her re-
sistant voice and transformative vision, The Sweet Hereafter concludes
its dialogue with Nicole speaking, again in voice-over, first to Ste-
phens and then to Billy. Her words provide yet another perspective on
the role of naming, blaming, and claiming, in responding to loss and
suffering. As Stephens sits in a limousine at an airport, looking
55. Billy appeals to Sam as one father to another, as one citizen to another. "If you would
drop your case," he pleads, "then the others would come to their senses. You are good, sensible
parents. People respect you."
56. See DERRIDA, supra note 40, at 61.
57. Over close-ups, first of the lips of her father, and then of Stephens, we hear Nicole's voice,
again reciting the fable. "And why I lied he only knew. But from my lie this did come true.
Those lips from which he drew his tune were frozen as a wintry moon."
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straight into the camera, we hear Nicole say, "two years later I wonder
if you realize something. I wonder if you understand that all of us,
Delores, me, the children who survived, the children who died.. .. "
The scene then shifts to Billy's garage, the camera captures a crane
gently raising the damaged bus, the end of the lawsuit freeing the dead
children to make a long delayed journey to heaven. With the bus sus-
pended in mid-air in the background, Billy stands, at first with his
back to the camera, hat in hand, in a gesture of respect. His work of
mourning is now complete. He turns away from this symbol of death,
puts his hat on, and looks straight at us, reminding us that he, and the
viewers, "saw it [the bus accident]."
The camera then moves from a close-up of Billy's face, to that of
Nicole, who continues enveloping him in her vision. She softly speaks,
"that we are all citizens of a different town now, a place with its own
special rules, its own special laws, a town of people living in the sweet
hereafter." The last word in this film is given neither to the lawyer,
nor to those who joined his cause, but rather to a child or a victim's
hope for a resolution of this culture's ambivalence about law and
litigation.
Nicole's statement reminds us of the contingency and variability of
responses in the hidden domains of civil justice, even as it points to a
transformation of our desires and anxieties about law and litigation,
and even as it points to the possibility of a legality which no longer
will seduce the innocent with false promises and empty hopes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Today, law lives in images that saturate our culture and have a
power all their own. Mass mediated images are as powerful, pervasive,
and important as other social forces, such as globalization, neo-coloni-
alism, and structural disempowerment of the poor, with which schol-
ars are already engaged. Like the engagement with these other critical
turn-of-the-century phenomena, reading film may lead us to new
places in our understanding of law. Film may open up new possibilities
for engagement with some of the most pervasive myths about civil
justice and civil litigation. Where "objective" and "neutral" social sci-
ence evidence is today unable to persuade or even initiate new con-
versational possibilities, we may find that the resources for critique of,
and critical engagement with, those myths are already present in pop-
ular culture.
The Sweet Hereafter is a significant moment in the cultural life of
law, focusing on the hidden domains of civil justice. In a culture ob-
sessed with trials, this film explores the social, psychological, cultural,
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and professional dimensions involved in the emergence and transfor-
mation of disputes. While the emphasis on the litigation explosion that
saturates the media might lead one to assume that law and litigation
exert a daunting and virtually irresistible allure, this film explores the
contingency and variability that necessarily are a part of the process of
naming, blaming, and claiming.
I have held out The Sweet Hereafter as one example in which popu-
lar culture focuses on what Stuart Scheingold calls "paradoxes of
power," as they emerge in the hidden domains of civil justice.58 In
such domains, law is powerful, but hardly seems to be an adequate
antidote to fate. Law is vulnerable to excess or indifference, to lies,
and to loss. This film shows us that litigation is a contingent social fact,
not an invariant social phenomenon. As a result, the film reminds its
viewers of the uncertainties and vulnerabilities that abound in the civil
justice system, showing law to be powerful, but fragile, attractive, but
resistible.
The Sweet Hereafter advances a critique of litigation; warning that
naming, blaming, and claiming may be as dangerous to the social
health of a community, as to the psychic health of persons in mourn-
ing. The film highlights the key, perhaps even dangerous, role of law-
yers in promoting litigation, even as it explores their own falsity and
fragility. In this film, the lawyer turns out to be most unscrupulous in
his inability to disentangle private need from public role.
Yet, while The Sweet Hereafter speaks to and fuels our fears of a
litigious society, it makes available images of other possibilities. The
film invites us to attend to voices at the margins, those society often
ignores, to society's least articulate members, its invisible victims,
members whose loss and suffering is most profound. These voices tell
an alternative story that partializes, if it does not undercut, the more
familiar story of litigation and its irresistible allure. This is a story of
desire, rather than fear. It is a story of desire for alternative responses
to loss and suffering. In voices at the margin we hear resistance, a
refusal to name, blame, and claim.
For some it is fatalism, for others it is community, for still others it is
love that lights the path away from law. The Sweet Hereafter makes
the contingencies and possibilities of law and of our responses to trag-
edy available to us. It provides but one dissenting note in popular cul-
ture against the chorus of those who warn of the irresistible pull of
litigation. In the end, The Sweet Hereafter demonstrates that neither
the law, nor the litigation that some now dread, are the law or the
58. This phrase was contained in a note from Scheingold to the author.
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litigation that we must have. These are not the only elements present
within the hidden domains of civil justice.
